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Reputation Aware Obfuscation for Mobile 
Opportunistic Networks 
Milena Radenkovic, Abderrahim Benslimane, Derek McAuley 
Abstract: Current anonymity techniques for mobile opportunistic networks typically use obfuscation algorithms to hide node’s 
identity behind other nodes. These algorithms are not well suited to sparse and disconnection prone networks with large 
number of malicious nodes and new opportunistic, adaptive. So, new, opportunistic, adaptive fully localized mechanisms are 
needed for improving user anonymity. This paper proposes reputation aware localized adaptive obfuscation for mobile 
opportunistic networks that comprises of two complementary techniques:  opportunistic collaborative testing of nodes’ 
obfuscation behaviour (OCOT) and multidimensional adaptive anonymisation (AA). OCOT-AA is driven by both explicit and 
implicit reputation building, complex graph connectivity analytics and obfuscation history analyses. We show that OCOT-AA is 
very efficient in terms of achieving high levels of node identity obfuscation and managing low delays for answering queries 
between sources and destinations while enabling fast detection and avoidance of malicious nodes typically within the fraction of 
time within the experiment duration. We perform extensive experiments to compare OCOT-AA with several other competitive 
and benchmark protocols and show that it outperforms them across a range of metrics over a one month real-life GPS trace. To 
demonstrate our proposal more clearly, we propose new metrics that include best effort biggest length and diversity of the 
obfuscation paths, the actual percentage of truly anonymised sources’ IDs at the destinations and communication quality of 
service between source and destination. 
Index Terms—Mobile communication systems, Privacy  
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1. INTRODUCTION
Rapid expansion of free social networking applications 
and mass scale distribution of user generated content is 
often contributed to pervasive mobile devices that allow 
mobile users to generate and consume digital content. 
Underlying networking protocols [20], [14], [17], [33], [10], 
[16], [19], [30], [28], [27] increasingly provide support for 
large scale content sharing that utilize both opportunistic 
networks among mobile devices and connections to 
cellular network and access points when within their 
range. 
There is a wide range of opportunistic content 
multimedia sharing systems that have been discussed in 
the literature such as podcasting [13] or interest based 
content sharing application for public transportation [15]. 
For example, bulky nature of multimedia content 
typically generated by  mobile devices when certain 
events happen or around interesting geographical 
locations, can benefit from opportunistic networking  as 
useful extension of the core infrastructure because that  
can carry large amount of traffic on its own [28].   
Additionally, these networks have been used to create 
new applications, such as epidemic voting [10] and social 
media [10], [12]. PeopleNet is architecture for information 
search in a distributed manner [8]. In [9] the authors 
propose a socio-aware overlay for an opportunistic 
pub/sub communication service. An interest based city-
wide opportunistic content dissemination system has 
been studied in [16]. Various architectures for email 
delivery from Internet to and within an opportunistic 
networking domain were discussed in [17]. In [19] a 
scalable content dissemination system with dynamic 
content is discussed that exploits both infrastructure and 
opportunistic contacts.  
Despite offering advantages for mobile users in terms 
of increased coverage and lower cost, the proposals that 
include opportunistic forwarding of user data have not 
yet been widely adopted. One of the key reasons for that 
is that users are inherently reluctant to interact with 
strangers or third parties, due to privacy concerns of 
social networking [20]. Work in [18], [22], [31], [34], [6], 
[21] focuses on how new approaches on improving 
privacy of users of opportunistic networks by obfuscating 
their identity, location or adding incentives for good 
behavior. Newly emerging work [20] proposes a new 
architecture that addresses the issues of lack of trust, 
delivery latency, loss of user control, and user privacy by 
combining the advantages of decentralized storage and 
opportunistic communications by bridging the gap 
between the user and the mobile social networking 
friends who are not in the vicinity of the user.  However, 
none of this work considers adaptive, self-organised 
privacy where trust levels of nodes can change depending 
on their behaviour which is the work we do in this paper.  
In this paper we explore how to design adaptive 
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reputation aware anonymous overlays in mobile 
opportunistic networks that manage complex trade-offs 
between quality of anonymisation of sending nodes and 
the quality of service the nodes receive (e.g. answers to 
their queries without being deanonymised). Managing 
this tradeoff is important as the better the obfuscation of 
the source ID is, the more difficult it is to identify it and 
route to it; and thus the  success ratio of answered queries 
decreases and the delays between source and destination 
increase. We assume that both the number and the 
distribution of malicious nodes that can reveal source 
identity can vary, good nodes can at times become 
malicious and vice versa, the underlying network can get 
very sparse and the user interests may also change. 
Because of this, it is important that the anonymisation 
overlay is responsive to the underlying topology, users’ 
interests and varying number of malicious nodes due to 
their behavioral changes in order to significantly improve 
nodes’ anonymity and privacy. 
 We propose to incorporate novel Opportunistic 
Collaborative Obfuscation Technique (OCOT) with a 
flexible multidimensional K-anonymity obfuscation 
technique AdaptAnon (AA) [22] in order to identify and 
build adaptive anonymisation overlays (paths) to hide the 
source’s identity from malicious nodes. OCOT-AA 
manages to discover malicious and trusted nodes with 
high accuracy and efficiently while providing high level 
of communication quality of service between sources and 
destinations.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Related 
work is given in the supplementary file. Section 2 
describes our threat model and provides high-level 
overview of privacy and forwarding in our opportunistic 
network proposal. Section 3 gives overview of a set of 
heuristics that are at the core of our OCOT-AA proposal 
and describes our algorithm in detail. Section 4 provides 
overview of our network model, real-life trace, defines 
multiple evaluation metrics, describes experiment 
scenario including benchmark and comparative 
protocols, and then discusses results from extensive 
evaluation of OCOT-AA. Section 5 gives conclusions. 
The contributions of this paper are multifold and 
include: 
• Identification of new privacy threats implicit in 
utilizing services in mobile opportunistic networks. 
• Proposal for opportunistic collaborative obfuscation 
testing (OCOT) technique that allows intelligent, 
efficient and accurate fully distributed reputation 
building based on the nodes’ obfuscation behaviour. 
We define efficiency as the percentage of testing 
time versus connectivity time between the nodes; it 
is denoted as “testing cost”. We define accuracy in 
terms of how fast the detection of the majority of 
malicious nodes and trusted nodes is.  
• Proposal for adaptive anonymisation technique that 
dynamically combines three types of implicit fully 
localized heuristics rooted in social complex graph 
theory that can track anonymisation history of all 
the nodes, adaptively select suitable anonymisers 
while taking into account that nodes may provide 
false information on their own heuristics. We define 
success of anonymisation in three following ways: 
percentage of source IDs obfuscated in the 
destination, maximum best effort achieved length of 
the obfuscation path (K), and maximum best effort 
diversity of the nodes in it (D). 
• Demonstration of practical feasibility of our 
proposal in terms of identification and mitigation of 
attacks over real-life trace highly challenged real life 
trace while preserving high level of communication 
quality of service. 
Our privacy analytics is useful for large-scale and 
online environments – e.g. in our real time obfuscation  
work [22] we have used live  real time GPS traces of San 
Francisco cabs [2] to show real-time visualisation of 
anonymisation parameters for AdaptAnon in ONE 
simulator [25]. We chose this trace as it is currently one of 
the largest real-world traces available (involving over 540 
nodes), spanning over multiple months with consistently 
highest frequency of movement updates. We envisage 
that our work can be easily integrated into fast evolving 
pervasive systems that require self-organising security 
capabilities driven by predictive patterns of complex 
dynamic graph theory. 
2. PRIVACY AND FORWARDING IN MOBILE 
OPPORTUNISTIC NETWORKS 
2.1. Threat Model 
There is a range of source obfuscation protocols that 
have been proposed for opportunistic networks with no 
infrastructure [6], [18], [21], [31]. They differ in how they 
determine optimal obfuscator by relying on a range of 
heuristics based on interest or connectivity similarities. 
Although these metrics are reasonable in a friendly 
wireless environment, they are not accurate in a hostile 
scenario and may lead to selecting malicious nodes as 
forwarders. 
The most trivial attack is that malicious node waits 
passively until other nodes select them as forwarding 
hops and then obtain their identities. But, to increase the 
probability of being selected as next hops for forwarding 
and therefore to improve their chances of revealing the 
sources’ IDs, malicious nodes can advertise false 
information about their own social network parameters 
such as centrality, similarity, betweenness, tie-strength, 
obfuscation history etc. This indirect attack aims to attract 
the traffic and queries forwarded to them and allows 
them to identify large number of sources’ identities. 
Testing the actual obfuscation behaviour of potential 
obfuscator nodes and assigning obfuscation reputation to 
them before selecting them is important and reduces the 
chances of malicious nodes being selected as obfuscators. 
However there is a range of attacks that can happen while 
these tests are being carried out. We assume that even the 
nodes that have been tested and reached a reputation 
value high enough to be considered “trusted” to perform 
obfuscation can become malicious at any point of time by 
starting to reveal other nodes’ identities. In this paper we 
will introduce techniques that will opportunistically keep 
testing the reliability of obfuscation behaviour of all the 
nodes (those considered to be “trusted”, malicious and 
tested). We will discuss a range of specific attacks during 
and after testing and how OCOT handles them in 3.2.  
In this work we will not consider network level attacks 
such as black or grey hole attacks as the attacking nodes 
target to reveal the identity of the source nodes and not to 
disrupt their network traffic.  
2.2. Reputation Aware Adaptive Obfuscation  
This section proposes OCOT-AA that combines two 
complementary techniques: adaptive obfuscation 
forwarding technique (AdaptAnon (AA) [21], [22]) and 
novel Opportunistic Collaborative Obfuscation Testing 
(OCOT) technique. OCOT-AA aims to fully locally test 
obfuscation behaviour of neighbouring nodes, gather and 
provide evidence of how good reputation in terms of 
obfuscation behaviour a node has each time before it is 
selected to be on the obfuscation path. The tested node 
can “pass” the tests and become “trusted” only if it gets 
tested by a certain number of “friend or “trusted” nodes 
and if the result of the aggregated test values exceeds 
“Threshold” (e.g. by using Eigen Vector Reputation 
Centrality). We describe this in more detail in Section 3. 
We refer to opportunistic as the ability of the nodes to 
test whenever and wherever they can. This is important 
in the face of potentially sparse and dynamic topologies. 
We refer to collaborative as to the requirement that the 
nodes need to collaborate with other nodes in order to 
perform the tests of obfuscation behaviour. Collaborative 
and opportunistic paradigms are typically assumed to be 
opposites of each other. To the best our knowledge this is 
the first proposal where we combine these two 
approaches in the reputation building schemes (depicted 
in Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Reputation aware adaptive obfuscation in mobile 
opportunistic networks 
 
OCOT-AA exploits dynamic label matching, temporal 
analysis of contact patterns and intelligent obfuscation in 
order to “hide” a source node among not only more 
nodes and but also more diverse nodes which provides 
stronger anonymity [5]. Section 3.1 introduces in detail 
our new proposal for OCOT technique while section 3.2. 
discusses its robustness and 3.3 gives its pseudo code. In 
3.4 we describe novel flexible, multi-dimensional 
approach to K-anonymity that enables reputation aware 
opportunistic identification and selection of the overlay 
anonymisation nodes in order to allow for better trade-off 
management between the maximum best effort length of 
the obfuscation path and the maximum best effort 
diversity of the nodes on it while avoiding malicious 
nodes and not degrading communication success ratio 
and delays. 
Figure 1 shows schematic representation of reputation 
aware adaptive obfuscation for mobile opportunistic 
networks (OCOT-AA). OCOT-AA enables a paradigm 
shift from traditional node anonymity in wireless ad-hoc 
networks to optimised anonymity with reduced apriori 
planning via the joint use of testing and reputation 
building and obfuscation and forwarding. 
Depending on where the reputation value is stored, 
when it is exchanged, and between which nodes, there is a 
range of possible solutions with different pros and cons. If 
we consider two radically different scenarios: first, tested 
node stores all reputation values assigned to it by the 
testing nodes and shares them when it encounters other 
nodes; and second, each testing node keeps its view of 
reputation values it assigns to the nodes it tested and 
exchanges them with other testing nodes to resolve the 
final reputation. In the first case, as the tested node stores 
complete history of its encounters and test results, the 
reputation building process always converges and the 
network overhead is low. In the second case, each node 
has its local view of the encountered nodes’ obfuscation 
behaviours based on its own experience and shares it 
with the other testing nodes. In this case, different parts of 
the network may resolve reputation for the same node 
differently, reputation convergence may be very slow and 
the network overheads might be very high as all nodes 
need to aggregate their knowledge by exchanging their 
information on encountering each other. This fully 
decentralised reputation building is not suitable for 
sparse hostile mobile opportunistic networks [35]. We 
therefore choose to design and build on the assumption of 
the first scenario where each node stores its reputation 
data about its own obfuscation behaviour that is signed 
by the nodes that tested it. We expand on this in Section 3. 
3. REPUTATION AWARE OBFUSCATION TESTING AND 
ADAPTIVE ANONYMISATION FOR MOBILE 
OPPORTUNISTIC NETWORKS  
3.1 Opportunistic Collaborative Obfuscation 
Testing 
We propose a self-organized reputation management 
technique coupled with certificate exchange that 
improves node identity obfuscation in mobile 
opportunistic networks. Our proposal assumes a set of F 
“friends” certified by the initial CA (e.g. any online social 
network such as Facebook). These nodes then act as 
second level CAs themselves and certify the public keys 
of the “trusted” nodes with their own certificates. We 
refer to the nodes that gained their reputation by 
performing reliable obfuscation tasks during testing as 
“trusted” nodes. Both “friends” and “trusted” nodes 
opportunistically test all other nodes by requesting from 
them to perform obfuscation of dummy messages where 
one of the “trusted” nodes is the source and the other one 
is the destination. These tests serve to identify whether 
nodes perform obfuscation and hide the real ID of the 
sending node or if they reveal it to the destination. Note 
that there must be at least two “testing” nodes collocated 
with the “tested” node in order for testing to be possible. 
When the destination receives a message from the tested 
node, it sends the ID that the tested node sent to it, back 
to the source. The functional overview of the OCOT 
testing scheme is shown in Figure 2.  
Figure 2. Testing scheme (OCOT) 
Figure 3. Hierarchical Reputation States in OCOT 
 
 Figure 3 shows hierarchical reputation state changes 
of nodes: when the node’s reputation increases it moves 
towards the “trusted” state and when it decreases: it 
moves towards “malicious” node state. Any unknown 
node starts with reputation value of 0.1, the increase 
coefficient is 1 and the decrease coefficient is 4 where the 
coefficients are weighted by the trust value of the testing 
node. The reputation value for a ”non-friend” node 
cannot go above 0.95 or go below 0. Figure 3 also shows 
that “friend and “trusted” nodes can perform testing on 
“trusted” and “malicious” nodes but not vice versa.  
During the time of testing the tested node does not 
know if the request for obfuscation is genuine and 
contains real data or an obfuscation test with dummy 
data. This is because the sending node may be considered 
to be the last node on the obfuscation path that aims to 
deliver the message to the destination with obfuscation 
path length equal to 1. Even if, after the testing has been 
completed, the tested node understands that it has been 
tested (e.g. by statistically analysing the obfuscation 
requests it received), it cannot change the opinions of the 
testing nodes. The test results are signed by the testing 
nodes’ private keys and cannot be modified by anyone. 
On the other hand, if the tested node refuses to 
participate in the test by either forwarding the data to 
another destination node different from the destination 
requested by the sending node, or by refusing to forward 
the data altogether, the testing nodes will not rank it 
highly and it will not be able to build its reputation value 
to become a “trusted” node (therefore no node will use it 
for the real forwarding and obfuscation requests). It is 
possible that a tested node refuses to store the result of 
test when it failed to satisfy the obfuscation request. Even 
though this can bring a short term benefit to the tested 
node, but the node’s reputation will quickly expire below 
the trusted threshold due to the testing timeout. Note that 
a node can preserve its “trusted” status only by 
continuously responding correctly to anonymisation 
requests. 
3.2 Robustness of Testing in OCOT  
One particularly interesting question is how much 
damage a node that has passed all the tests and became 
“trusted” can do when it decides to stop obfuscating the 
source nodes, and what mechanisms OCOT provides to 
minimise the negative impacts of this. OCOT can revoke a 
“trusted” node’s reputation in two ways: first the signed 
keys of the “trusted” nodes expire after a relatively short 
period of time, and second “friend” and “trusted” nodes 
keep performing obfuscation tests on the “trusted” nodes. 
If a “trusted” node fails a test, the testing node will issue a 
new certificate to the tested “trusted” node in which the 
testing node will overwrite its reputation value in their 
certificate to much lower (or zero) reputation values. 
Note, we do not revoke a node’s certificate itself but only 
modify its reputation value. Consequently, even though 
an  “untrusted” node will be able to store its test results to 
another node, its opinion will not be taken into account. 
 In order to account for attacks launched by the 
“trusted” nodes during the testing phase we aggregate 
reputation values of all involved testing nodes. For 
example, when a “friend” node (with reputation 1) 
initiates testing with a “trusted” node (with reputation 
0.8), “trusted” node may send false information to the 
“friend” node, the “friend” node signs the tested node 
with the obfuscation results weighted by 0.8 (1*0.8). 
Another critical question refers to how OCOT can 
prevent the corrupt “trusted” node from revealing the 
reputation results, node IDs and timestamps to the 
services and to the “tested” nodes. To counteract this, in 
OCOT, the “friend” nodes’ certificate subject cannot be 
easily mapped to the “friend” node real ID because the 
“friend’s pseudo ID used in the tests is different from its 
real ID. We assume that all “friend” and “trusted” nodes 
have short term pseudo IDs that can change often (i.e. a 
node can provide a different pseudo ID for each new test) 
in addition to its real ID. This means that the 
compromised “trusted” node may be able to determine 
that node X1 had tested it at time t1 but it will not know 
who X1 node is.  
When there are multiple nodes to be tested in the 
neighbourhood, OCOT follows either a target based 
policy, such as the node that is the closest to passing the 
reputation threshold gets tested first, or age based policy - 
the one that has been tested the longest time ago gets 
tested first. In highly challenged environments where the 
expected connectivity durations are short and the density 
of nodes is high, it is important to be efficient and test 
nodes with higher priority first as their involvement in 
the obfuscation will result in significant difference to the 
performance of OCOT.  
3.3. Pseudo code of OCOT and mathematical 
notation 
The pseudo code of the OCOT algorithm is shown in 
Figure 4. It begins with identifying the nodes in the 
neighbourhood that could perform the testing and those 
that should be tested (lines 2, 3): The pseudo-code then 
moves to how the testing nodes are chosen and paired up 
to test tested nodes. This is important in order to 
determine if testing is feasible at a given time and to 
prevent repetition of sequential coupling of the same 
testing/tested nodes (lines 5-7, 11-13). We also ensure that 
we do not test the same node far too often (lines 8-
10).When the three nodes that participate in a test are 
allocated, second part of the code outlines the testing 
process. It shows how the source of the testing node 
generates a pseudo ID (line 14), and uses it to initiate a 
request for obfuscation testing to the selected “friend” or 
“trusted” node (line 15). It then initiates a request for 
obfuscation to the tested node asking it to forward its 
pseudo ID to the “trusted”/”friend” node. It waits for the 
tested node to perform the anonymisation and for the 
“friend”/”trusted” node to forward the result of the 
obfuscation back to it (line 16). After it receives the 
response it generates a value for the Reputation status of 
the tested node based on its opinion of the tested node 
performance, signs it digitally and stores the updated 
Reputation value onto the tested node (lines 17-20).  
 
 
 
This is more formally annotated in Formula 1. 
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where , is the present reputation rating of node U 
by nodes A and B,  

,	  is the reputation rating 
recorded during the previous test. The conditions for the 
present testing are expressed as 	∃	,  standing for the 
availability of “trusted” testing nodes A and B, and 	
 ≥ 
  representing the time period since the 
previous testing 
  as longer or equal to the pre-
configured testing period  . The length of the testing 
period can play significant role in the performance of our 
proposed approach. We discuss this in detail and present 
graphs in the supplementary file.  
3.4 Obfuscation and Forwarding 
As the accuracy of the test results is more important 
for obfuscation testing than the time factor, we use the 
average values of weighted reputation results without 
discounting histories. Thus we resolve reputation as the 
weighted sum of all opinions divided by the total number 
of nodes as  
 = ∑  !∙!	|$|!%&|'| 						 |( ≥ 8   (2) 
where Ti is opinion of the node i for the reputation 
value of node m, and wi is the weight of this opinion that 
depends on the reputation value that node i has at the 
time of signing node m’s reputation value, and v is the 
ALGORITHM TestNeighbours 
1. FUNCTION TestNeighbours(List Contacts) { 
2.         List TestingNodes = extractTestingNodes(Contacts); 
3.         List TestedNodes = extractTestedNodes(Contacts); 
 
4.         IF (TestingNodes.Length() AND TestedNodes.Length()) THEN 
5.                 FOR (int c=0; c < TestedNodes.Length(); c++) DO  
6.                         Node TestedNode = TestedNodes(c); 
7.                         Node TestingNode = TestingNodes(c%TestingNodes.Length()); 
8.                         IF (TimeNow – TestedNode.TimeLastTest) < TestInterval THEN 
9.                                 NEXT 
10.                         END IF 
11.                         IF TestedNode == TestingNode  THEN 
12.                                 TestingNode = TestingNodes((c+1)%TesingNodes.Length()); 
13.                         END IF 
14.                         FakeNodeId = generateTempRandomNodeId(); 
15.                         requestTestingCooperation(TestingNode, FakeNodeId); 
16.                         requestObfuscation(TestedNode, TestingNode, FakeNodeId); 
17.                         float TestResult = recvTestResult(TestingNode); 
18.                         float ReputationValue =  
updateCommulativeReputation(TestedNode, TestResult, TestingNode. reputation_value); 
19.                         X509Sign(ReputationValue); 
20.                         storeReputation(TestedNode, ReputationValue); 
21.             END FOR 
22.     END IF 
23. END FUNCTION 
 
Figure 4. OCOT Algorithm 
total number of nodes that tested node m. The minimum 
required number of testing nodes, 8, has been 
experimentally determined to achieve best trade-off 
between quality of anonymisation and quality of service.  
When the reputation values are updated and before the 
source forwards its request to the service, the source 
initiates obfuscation process that aims to hide its identity 
by enabling opportunistic identification and selection of 
the trusted anonymisation overlay. This overlay manages 
complex trade-offs between reliability, length of the 
obfuscation path and the diversity of the nodes on it 
while not degrading success ratio and delays. 
Prioritisation of overlay nodes is based first on their 
reputation values, and then on connectivity patterns, and 
interest profile similarity, and anonymisation history. 
More detailed discussion on our obfuscation heuristics is 
given in the supplementary file but here we give a brief 
overview of three main classes of heuristics: 1) locally 
evaluated heuristics driven by the network topology and 
contact history analysis include nodes’ “betweenness” 
centrality [1], [11], social “similarity” [1], [11], and tie 
strength relationships [1], [11], between the nodes; 2) 
heuristics driven by interest and user profile analysis 
include the degree of profiles’ similarity nodes share 
when they meets based on the number of matched profile 
attributes versus the number of total attributes (L), 
denoted as LabelSimilarity. 
*+,-./.+012 = |3(4)∩3(6)|
|3(4)∪3(6)|
  (3) 
3) Combining social connectivity driven and profile 
driven metrics allows OCOT-AA to increase the length of 
the anonymisation path (K) compared to using only one 
of these two metrics alone because it allows more options 
for the selection of the next hop anonymisation node. 
However this can still result in predictable choices of the 
nodes in the anonymisation layer and thus have negative 
impact on the anonymisation quality. In order to 
counterbalance the decidability of the previous two 
heuristics, we propose the third type of heuristics that is 
driven by the analytics of the anonymisation history 
performed by every node and for every potential 
anonymising node. This allows OCOT-AA to increase the 
diversity of the nodes in the K overlay in order to 
improve the utilisation of the overlay nodes. Each node 
calculates the ratio of the number of times the next hop 
has been used by the given origin and by all other sources 
in order to be able to make less greedy decisions. 
NodeRatio	(N) = 	
@ABCDEAEFGHI(@)
∑ @ABCDEAEFGHI(J)K∈M
  (4) 
Each node also keeps the ratio of the number of times 
the next hop has been on the anonymisation path for the 
particular Service and has been used for all other services.  
ServiceRatio	(S) = 	
RCSTJUCDEAEFGHI(R)
∑ RCSTJUCDEAEFGHI(V)W∈X
  (5) 
Finally, each node keeps track of the ratio of the 
number of times the next hop has been used to 
anonymise this source for this service, and the number of 
times it has anonymised other nodes for this service. 
/-0(Y-Z[\-]+1[	(Z, /) =
|4^_`a^abcde(4)		∩		f`ghi`a^abcde(f)|	
|f`ghi`a^abcde(f)|
 (6) 
Note that in this paper we assume equal weights 
between heuristics but it is also possible to use different 
weighing models in order to prioritise some criteria over 
the others if that is suitable. As we assume unfriendly 
environments with varying percentage of malicious 
nodes, OCOT constantly re-evaluates the nodes trust 
values and ranks them so it results in most accurate and 
least predictable chosen nodes. Each node scans the 
neighbourhood and performs testing as described in 
Figure 3 and ranks the nodes according to their 
reputation values. Only if a node is a “trusted” node, i.e. 
its reputation value exceeds the predefined reputation 
threshold it may be selected as a next hop for obfuscation. 
After it has been determined that a node is a “trusted” 
node, forwarding is described in more detail and pseudo 
code is listed in the supplementary file.  
4. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
4.1. Network Scenario 
Mobile opportunistic networks enable mobile users to 
participate in various social interactions with applications 
such as content distribution and micro-blogs. Mobile 
opportunistic networks allow direct one-hop 
communications between devices carried by people or 
vehicles while on the move. In this way the nodes are 
involved in participatory interactions with their 
surrounding without having to rely on wireless 
infrastructure. Because of their open and distributed 
nature, securing user interactions relies rather on trust 
than hard cryptography [4], [19], [32], [33]. Trust in this 
context is typically based on past users’ interactions and 
behaviour such as in reputation systems relying on 
ratings that may be based on “belonging” to online social 
networks and on other users opinions. For example social 
online networks are utilized where a set of nodes coming 
from the same online social network is assumed to 
explicitly trust each other. By leveraging the social online 
networks for secure pairing of online nodes with wireless 
nodes, we propose to use social trust bootstrapping that 
cannot be compromised together with implicit reputation 
management that relies on nodes obfuscation behaviour, 
connectivity and interest analytics. As the nodes in 
mobile opportunistic networks can use only the nodes 
they encounter for data transmission the connectivity 
analysis (rather than mobility) is key to how much data 
nodes can communicate with the others. [33] defines 
connectivity duration, isolation duration and average 
number of neighbours as key metrics that influence 
communication feasibility and quality in these networks.  
Previous research has performed comparisons of 
various real-life traces and identified substantial 
differences in connection duration, isolation duration, 
and number of neighbours. San Francisco Cab Trace [2] 
has been shown to be the most challenging trace with 
very short connectivity durations [1], very long isolation 
time [1] and low number of neighbours [1] compared to 
other social traces (such as Sassy[7] and Infocom[14]). For 
example, SF Cab [2] traces exhibit predominantly short 
contact durations (a mean of 31sec) while Infocom 2006 
displays substantially longer contact durations (a mean of 
3min). In this work we choose to focus on reporting on SF 
traces as most challenging dataset currently available. 
4.2. Real life data set description and analysis  
We performed extensive evaluation of OCOT-AA in 
ONE[25] using live GPS traces of 540 San Francisco cabs, 
logged approximately every 10 seconds, over a period of 
30 days. We downloaded the most recent at the time of 
writing traces for the period of September 20th 2012 to 
October 20th 2012 via the Cabspoting.org API. These 
traces are part of the Cabspotting project [2] that aim to 
infer and visualise Taxi Cab collocation information from 
GPS coordinates in the San Francisco Bay Area. We have 
assumed that two cabs are collocated if their physical 
distance is less than 50 meters and used a time interval of 
60 seconds. This trace has shown to exhibit long periods 
of disconnections, short periods of connectivity and 
islands of connectivity that are rarely populated by more 
than two nodes. 
4.3. Evaluation metrics/criteria 
We perform evaluation across ten metrics described 
below. 
We first analyse the efficiency of OCOT in order to 
better understand what costs in terms of traffic and 
delays it imposes to the obfuscation and forwarding. It is 
very important that testing does not take negative impact 
on the data traffic during the connectivity times by taking 
large proportion of connectivity time and resources for 
testing. Similarly, given potentially highly sparse 
topology, it is crucial that the malicious nodes are 
discovered quickly. Our experiments show both high 
efficiency in terms of testing resources and high speed of 
discovering the malicious and trusted nodes. This is due 
to our reputation converging very fast and being 
accurate. We use five different metrics: number of tests 
performed, trusted and malicious detection rate, testing 
cost, detection rate and number of different nodes 
performing testing, achieved K and D versus sparseness 
of topology to show effectiveness and accuracy of our 
proposal. These metrics are discussed in detail in the 
supporting file. In this paper we define five core metrics 
for evaluating effectiveness of OCOT-AA that includes: 
success ratio and delays of answered queries, length and 
diversity of the anonymisation path (K and D) and failure 
rate. We define D as 
1 −
klm∩kl∆m
klm∪kl∆m
  (7) 
where Kpt is the set of nodes on the K path at the time 
of a query and Kpo	t is the set of the node the K path at the 
time of the next query. We define anonymisation failure 
as the real identity of the source getting revealed to the 
destination. We define failure rate as 
 
6p
6m
  (8) 
where Mf is the number of messages with failed 
obfuscation and Mt is the total number of messages 
delivered to destination. 
4.4. Experiment set up and comparison with 
benchmark and state of the art protocols 
During experiments, when we analyse the influence of 
changing numbers and distribution of malicious nodes, 
we keep percentage of “friend” nodes to 5% while we 
increase percentage of malicious nodes with the following 
steps of increase: 5%, 10%, 20%, 30% and 40%. We argue 
that this choice of scenarios allows us to test our protocol 
in a range of different scenarios which is important as 
they can be applicable to the real world scenarios. We 
perform comparative analysis of OCOT-AA and two 
other competitive protocols SRR [19], where trust is 
assumed between nodes belonging to same social 
communities, and SimBetTS [11], where trust is based the 
similarity of social connectivity between nodes. To allow 
fair comparison, we extend SRR and SimBetTS to support 
obfuscation in the nodes that are elected to be on an 
anonymisation path by the source. We show that OCOT-
AA manages highly dynamic trade-offs between 
directionality and diversity, as well as anonymity and 
quality of service. We show that explicit testing is 
essential for high levels of anonymity and assumptions of 
implicit trust conveyed in utilising online social networks 
or similarity of opportunistic contacts based analysis can 
be damaging as it results in high levels of failed 
anonymisation. 
4.5 Results  
 4.5.1 Success Ratio and Delay 
Figure 5 shows the success ratio over increased 
number of queries. AdaptAnon [21] has the highest 
success ratio, followed closely by SimBetTS and OCOT-
AA 5% M, OCOT-AA 10% M OCOT-AA 20% M. OCOT-
AA 30% M OCOT-AA 40% M and SRR [19] manage less 
than half the success ratio compared to the first three.  
Figure 5. Success ratio vs. increasing number of queries 
 
AdaptAnon performs the best because it utilises two 
(social and encounter-based) mechanisms to determine 
the next anonymising node on its path. SimbetTS is 
second because it efficiently exploits the high degree of 
encounter similarity over SF taxi trace that has social 
complex graph properties. OCOT-AA 5% M follows as its 
testing method allows it to monitor obfuscation 
behaviour and detect malicious nodes quickly and find 
paths that are similar to AdaptAnon’s and Simbets’s. We 
observe that OCOT-AA 10% M, OCOT-AA 20% M, 
OCOT-AA 30% M, OCOT-AA 40% M achieve success 
ratios that are inversely proportional to the percentages of 
malicious nodes. SRR manages the worst success ratios as 
it cannot detect and utilise nodes that have matching 
social roles in a sparse topology. 
Figure 6 shows delays (in seconds) for varying 
percentages of malicious nodes over increasing number of 
queries. The three worst performing protocols with 
highest delays are OCOT-AA 40% M, OCOT-AA 30% M, 
and OCOT-AA 20% M that manage delays from 2000 to 
2800 seconds. This is due the large number of malicious 
nodes that cannot be utilized for testing and obfuscation. 
The best performing protocol is SimbetTS because it 
targets the most direct route to the destination. OCOT-AA 
5% M, SRR, OCOT-AA 10% M and AdaptAnon have very 
similar performance between themselves and are only 
about 400 seconds above SimBetTS for low sending rates 
and about 800 seconds above for high sending rates. They 
manage performance about 800 seconds below OCOT-AA 
40% M, OCOT-AA 30% M, and OCOT-AA 20% M for low 
sending rates and are nearly the same as them for high 
sending rates. OCOT adds only less than 5 min compared 
to the anonymisation protocols without testing, has 
similar delay to epidemic benchmark routing protocol 
without any anonymisation and is better than random 
walk This shows that delays between sources and 
destinations are mainly due to the sparse and 
disconnected underlying topology rather than the testing 
and intelligent anonymisation that OCOT-AA employs. 
Figure 6. Delay vs. increasing number of queries 
 
4.5.2. Length of the Obfuscation Path (L) and Diversity 
of Nodes on it (D) 
Figure 7 shows that AdaptAnon [21] manages the 
highest K because of its multi-criteria selection of next 
hop anonymisers and lack of awareness of malicious 
nodes. It is followed by OCOT-AA 5%M and then OCOT-
AA 10% M, OCOT-AA 20% M, OCOT-AA 30% M and 
OCOT-AA 40%M ranging from 5 to 3. The higher 
percentage of malicious nodes there are, the fewer nodes 
are able to test. This leads to shorter best effort K that is 
inversely proportional to the percentage of malicious 
nodes. SRR [19] manages the lowest K while SimBetTS 
[11] a higher than it but still lower than OCOT-AA 40% 
M. This is because SimBetTS has more opportunities to 
choose from when selecting the anonymisation nodes 
compared to SRR but still less opportunity than OCOT-
AA 40% M whose efficient testing stage allows it to 
choose a diversity of next hops. 
Figure 7. K vs increasing number of queries 
 
Figure 7 shows the diversification factor of various 
percentages of malicious nodes over increasing number of 
queries. AdaptAnon manages the highest D because it 
specifically considers intelligent anonymisation that 
prevents it from over-utilising the same nodes for the 
anonymisation path. Next follow all OCOT-AA protocols 
as they manage to accurately and timely identify 
malicious nodes and are able to avoid them by using 
other nodes effectively.  
We observe that all OCOT-AA protocols achieve very 
similar level of D that range between 65% and 75% for 
low sending rates and between 40% and 55% for high 
sending rates. AA 5%M has the highest level of 
diversification within them. Because SimBetTS and SRR 
use only contact and social role similarity respectively 
they manage low diversification of 61% and 52% for low 
sending rates and 21% and 15% for high sending rates. 
This is about two to five times less than what AdaptAnon 
achieves, and 40% to 30% lower than OCOT-AA with 40% 
malicious nodes. 
4.5.3 Number of Tests Performed and Failed 
Anonymisation 
We have analysed the total number of test performed 
over 30 days across 540 cabs for increasing number of 
malicious nodes. As the number of discovered “trusted” 
nodes increases, increasing number of nodes have the 
opportunity to perform testing and the total number of 
tests grows. We observed that the average number of tests 
per hour, per car ranges from 38 to 130. This is reasonable 
frequency of testing in the face of unknown number and 
distribution of malicious nodes.  
Figure 8. D rate vs increasing number of queries 
 
Figure 9. Anonymisation failure vs time 
 
Figure 9 shows percentage of failed source rate of 
anonymisation for AdaptAnon [21] and OCOT-AA over 
time of 30 days in the presence of various percentages of 
“friend” nodes. For the purpose of clear analyses note 
that we fix the number of malicious nodes to 5% and that 
is the reason for the failure rates not being above 5%. We 
observe that for OCOT-AA there is no significant 
difference in the percentage of de-obfuscated nodes when 
the number of “friends” change but that there is a steep 
learning curve of the nodes that accurately detect 
malicious nodes and are able to avoid them as the time 
progresses (the failure rates drop from around 3% to 1%). 
For AdaptAnon (OCOT-AA without testing) we observe 
failed anonymisation rate that is proportional to the 
percentage of the malicious nodes we consider here. This 
is due to calculating failed anonymisation percentage as 
average per day across all nodes that are highly likely to 
meet all the malicious nodes.  
Figure 10 shows the percentage of failed 
anonymisation for OCOT-AA and AdaptAnon [23] over 
the one month period and in the face of increasing 
proportion of malicious nodes. We define failed 
anonymisation as the real ID of the source being revealed 
to the destination. For OCOT-AA, we observe that 
scenario of OCOT-AA with 5% malicious nodes has 
around 3% of failure in the early stages of learning but 
quickly drops to 1% while OCOT-AA 40% malicious 
nodes scenario starts with failure rates of 5.2% but drops 
to 4%. This is because at all times OCOT-AA performs 
testing to detect and avoid malicious nodes. OCOT-AA 
10%, 20% and 30% lie in between. This shows that our 
testing stage is efficient as the nodes reputation values are 
resolved quickly but also that the OCOT-AA is efficiently 
hiding the real source IDs for very different percentages 
of malicious nodes and at different stages of learning. The 
only reason for failure is when nodes with previous high 
reputation values turn malicious and fail to anonymise 
but their reputation status has not expired fast enough.  
Figure 10. Anonymisation failure vs time 
 
This is a reasonable trade-off between dramatically 
increasing testing cost versus decreasing 1% or 2% of 
anonymisation failure rates. Without testing, we show 
that AdaptAnon has much higher percentage of failed 
anonymisation ranging from 5% to 40% for increasing 
number of malicious nodes. This is due to AdaptAnon 
not being aware of malicious nodes and experiencing 
average anonymisation failure for all nodes proportional 
to the percentage of malicious nodes in the topology.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper proposed a novel reputation aware 
obfuscation framework (OCOT-AA) for mobile 
opportunistic networks that integrates to novel 
techniques: multi criteria fully distributed intelligent 
anonymisation and opportunistic collaborative 
obfuscation testing. OCOT-AA allows successful source 
anonymisation even in the presence of large number of 
malicious nodes in the network. We assume that 
malicious nodes can intercept the messages from the 
senders while they are on their multi-hop path from the 
source to the destination and reveal sources’ identity. 
Because, we assume that any node can become malicious 
at any time, our testing technique is fully localised and 
allows testing of any node by two nodes as long as they 
are trusted above a certain threshold. We use three types 
of implicit heuristics for intelligent anonymisation that 
allows responsiveness to the underlying topology, social 
interests and history of anonymisation behaviour. OCOT-
AA manages high detection rate and avoidance of 
malicious nodes in the face of varying levels of malicious 
nodes and varying node degree centrality while it 
manages long anonymisation path, high diversification of 
anonymisation nodes, success ratios of delivered 
messages and low delays. We compare OCOT-AA to 
benchmark algorithms that exploit underlying 
connectivity analysis and social roles for building the 
“trusted obfuscation path” and analyse the impact of 
malicious node on four protocols with different decision 
making criteria for building the anonymisation path for 
sparse mobile environments. We show that OCOT-AA 
manages better trade-off and achieves better results in 
terms of ten criteria compared to other benchmark and 
competitive protocols.  
REFERENCES 
[1] Milena Radenkovic, Andrew Grundy, "Efficient and Adaptive 
Congestion Control for Heterogeneous Delay Tolerant Networks", 
Elsevier Ad Hoc Networks journal, April 2012  
[2] Cab mobility traces, Exploratorium - the museum of science, the 
cabspotting project, http://cabspotting.org/ 
[3] E Bulut, B K Szymanski, Exploiting Friendship Relations for 
Efficient Routing in Mobile Social Networks,  IEEE Transactions on 
Parallel and Distributed Systems, 2012 
[4] E Bulut, B K. Szymanski: Friendship Based Routing in Delay 
Tolerant Mobile Social Networks. GLOBECOM 2010: 1-5 
[5] A Tran, N Hopper, Y Kim. Hashing it out in public: common failure 
modes of DHT-based anonymity schemes. In Proc. OfWPES '09. 
ACM, NY, USA 
[6] I. Parris, T. Henderson: Privacy-enhanced social-network routing. 
Computer Communications 35(1): 62-74 (2012) 
[7] G. Bigwood, D. Rehunathan, M. Bateman, et al, CRAWDAD data set 
st_andrews/sassy (v. 2011-06-03) 
[8] Mehul Motani, Vikram Srinivasan, Pavan S. Nuggehall,  PeopleNet: 
engineering a wireless virtual social network,  in Proceedings of ACM 
Mobicom 2005,  243-257, NY, USA 
[9] E. Yoneki, P. Hui, S. Chan, and J. Crowcroft. A socio-aware overlay 
for publish/ subscribe communication in delay tolerant networks. In 
ACM MSWiM’07:  
[10] A-K PIETILÄINEN, C. DIOT, Dissemination in Opportunistic Social 
Networks: The Role of Temporal Communities, MobiHoc’12 2012 
[11] E. Daly, M. Haahr, Social network analysis for information flow in 
disconnected Delay-Tolerant MANETs, IEEE Trans. Mob. Comp, 
2009  
[12] Asthana, S.; Kalofonos, D.N., "The Problem of Bluetooth Pollution 
and Accelerating Connectivity in Bluetooth Ad-Hoc Networks," 
Pervasive Computing and ommunications, PerCom 2005. Third IEEE 
International Conference on , vol., no., pp.200,207, 8-12 March 2005 
[13] M. May, V. Lenders, G. Karlsson, and C. Wacha. Wireless 
opportunistic podcasting: implementation and design tradeoffs. In 
CHANTS’07: Proceedings of the second workshop on Challenged 
networks CHANTS, 2007 
[14] J. Scott, R. Gass, J. Crowcroft, P. Hui, C. Diot, and A. Chaintreau. 
CRAWDAD data set cambridge/haggle (v. 2009-05-29). Downloaded 
from http://crawdad.cs.dartmouth.edu/cambridge/haggle, May 2009 
[15]  L. McNamara, C. Mascolo, and L. Capra. Media sharing based on 
colocation prediction in urban transport. In MobiCom’08: 
Proceedings, 2008 
[16]  J. Leguay, A. Lindgren, J. Scott, T. Friedman, and J. Crowcroft. 
Opportunistic content distribution in an urban setting. In 
CHANTS’06: Proceedings of the 2006 SIGCOMM workshop on 
Challenged networks, 2006 
[17] T. Hyyryl¨ainen, T. K¨arkk¨ainen, C. Luo, et al. Opportunistic email 
distribution and access in challenged heterogeneous environments. In 
CHANTS’07: Proceedings of the second ACM workshop on 
Challenged networks, 2007 
[18] Greg Bigwood, Tristan Henderson: Bootstrapping opportunistic 
networks using social roles. WOWMOM 2011: 1-6 
[19]  S. Ioannidis, A. Chaintreau, and L. Massouli´e. Optimal and scalable 
distribution of content updates over a mobile social network. In 
Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM, 2009 
[20] Kanchana Thilakarathna, Aline Carneiro Viana, Aruna Seneviratne, 
Henrik Petander: Mobile social networking through friend-to-friend 
opportunistic content dissemination. MobiHoc 2013: 263-266 
[21] M.Radenkovic, I. Vaghi, .S. Zakhary, A. Benslimane, "AdaptAnon: 
Adaptive Anonymity for Service Queries in Mobile Opportunistic 
Networks", in the Proceedings of IEEE ICC, Budapest, Hungary, 
June, 2013 
[22] M Radenkovic, I Vaghi, Adaptive User Anonymity for Mobile 
Opportunistic Networks, ACM MobiCom CHANTS 2012. 
[23] A. J. Khan, V. Subbaraju, A. Misra, S. Seshan, Mitigating the true 
cost of advertisement supported "free" mobile applications, 
HotMobile 2012 
[24] A. Keränen, J. Ott, T. Kärkkäinen The ONE simulator for DTN 
protocol evaluation Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference 
on Simulation Tools and Techniques (SIMUTools), ICST, Brussels, 
Belgium (2009), pp. 1–10 
[25] Lindgren, A. Doria, O. Schelén, Probabilistic routing in intermittently 
connected networks, in: Proceedings of the 1st International 
Workshop on Service Assurance with Partial and Intermittent 
Resources (SAPIR), 2004, pp. 239–254 
[26] P. Hui, J. Crowcroft, E. Yoneki Bubble rap: social-based forwarding 
in delay tolerant networks,  Proceedings of the 9th ACM International 
Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing 
(MobiHoc), ACM, New York, NY, USA (2008) 
[27] Zhong Li, Cheng Wang, Siqian Yang, Changjun Jiang, Ivan 
Stojmenovic: Improving Data Forwarding in Mobile Social Networks 
with Infrastructure Support: A Space-Crossing Community Approach. 
CoRR abs/1307.7326 (2013) 
[28] Afra Mashhadi, Pan Hui, “Proactive Caching for Hybrid Urban 
Mobile Networks”,,  Deutsche Telekom Laboratories, Germany, 
Paper ID: 1569334407 
[29] K. Fall, S. Farrell: DTN: an architectural retrospective. IEEE Journal 
on Selected Areas in Communications 26(5)  (2008) 
[30] Anna Kaisa Pietiläinen, Christophe Diot: Dissemination in 
opportunistic social networks: the role of temporal communities. 
MobiHoc 2012: 165-174 
[31] Greg Bigwood, Tristan Henderson: IRONMAN: Using Social 
Networks to Add Incentives and Reputation to Opportunistic 
Networks. SocialCom/PASSAT 2011: 65-72  
[32] R15 Ólafur R. Helgason, Emre A. Yavuz, Sylvia T. Kouyoumdjieva, 
Ljubica Pajevic, and Gunnar Karlsson, “A Mobile Peer-to-Peer 
System for Opportunistic Content-Centric Networking”, In Proc 
Mobiheld 2010, p 21-26 
[33] Pan Hui, Jon Crowcroft, Eiko Yoneki: BUBBLE Rap: Social-Based 
Forwarding in Delay-Tolerant Networks. IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 
10(11): 1576-1589 (2011 
[34] S. Zakhary, M. Radenkovic, and A. Benslimane. Efficient Location 
Privacy-Aware Forwarding in Opportunistic Mobile Networks. 
Accepted for publication in Transactions on Vehicular Technology, 
IEEE, 2013 
[35] Abdullatif Shikfa, “Security Issues in Opportunistic Networks” 
Mobiopp 2010 February 22-23, 2010 
  
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES 
 
Milena Radenkovic has received her PhD Degree from the University of Nottingham, UK and her Dipl Ing (Msc) 
from the University of Nis, Serbia. Her research spans the areas of mobile and delay tolerant networking, P2P 
systems, and their application to pervasive gaming, social networking, and environmental monitoring. She has been 
an Investigator of four EPSRC grants. Milena has organised and chaired over ten international IEEE and 
ACM  conferences, served on many program committees and editorial boards and published in premium venues 
including Elsevier Ad Hoc Networks, IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, ACM MC2R, IEEE ICC, IEEE 
WONS, IEEE Multimedia, MIT Press PRESENCE, ACM Multimedia, IEEE Multimedia, ACM VRST, ACM CCGRID. 
She has served as an Independent Expert for EU FP7 programme and has been Evaluator for both EU and EPSRC 
proposals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abderrahim Benslimane is a Technical International Expert at the French Ministry of Foreign and European 
affairs as Coordinator of the Faculty of Engineering at the French University of Egypt where he is also Head of 
the Informatics Research Center. He is Professor of Computer-Science at the Avignon University/France since 
2001 from which he is now in secondment. He was attributed the French award of Scientific Excellency (2011-
2014). He has been as Associate Professor at the University of Technology- Belfort-Montbéliard since 1994. He 
obtained the French title to supervise researches, 2000, Cergy-Pontoise University/France. He received the PhD 
degree, 1993, Franche-Comte University/France. His current research and teaching interests are in wireless and 
mobile networks. He has more than 130 refereed international publications. 
He has several international collaborations for funded research projects and supervising PhD students. He is 
member of several editorial boards of international journals: IEEE Wireless Communication Magazine, Wiley 
WCMC, SCN, IJCS, Elsevier Ad Hoc, JNCA. He serves as General-Chair of the IEEE WiMob since 2008; he lunched and serves as General-
Chair of iCOST and MoWNet since 2011. He serves as a Symposium co-chair/leader in many IEEE international conferences such as ICC, 
Globecom, AINA and VTC. He was GE of many special issues. He participates to the steering and the program committee of many IEEE 
international conferences. He is Board committee member, Vice-chair of Student activities of IEEE France section/Region 8, since 2008, 
Publication Vice-chair of the ComSoc TC of Communication and Information Security 2009-2011. 
 
 
Derek McAuley has engaged in a career transitioning between academic research (Cambridge, Glasgow and 
Nottingham Universities), commercial research (founding member of labs for Microsoft, Marconi and Intel), and roles 
in several successful startups, most recently XenSource and Netronome. He is Professor of Digital Economy in the 
School of Computer Science at the University of Nottingham and Director of the Horizon Digital Economy Research 
Institute; his research has covered ubiquitous computing, computer architecture, networking, photonics, distributed 
systems and operating systems. He is a Fellow of the British Computer Society and member of the UKCRC, a 
computing research expert panel of the IET and BCS. 
 
